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By Charles W. Pierson.
The immediate consequences of the decision affirming the con-
stitutionality of the Federal Corporation Tax are so slight that its
profound significance is likely to be overlooked. At its present
rate the tax is not burdensome and has proved easy of collection.
The thing upon which it falls-the privilege of doing business in
a corporate capacity-is an abstraction which makes little appeal
to the sympathies or the moral sense. The public, more con-
cerned with present conditions than with the passing of a theory,
is indifferent.
Thus it has sometimes been with the turning points in the
affairs of nations. They came quietly and without observation,
and it remained for the historians to mark the actual parting of
the ways.
The Supreme Court holds, and in its opinion reiterates many
times, that the tax is upon the privilege of doing business in a
corporate capacity.
Right here is the crux of the matter. Corporate capacity is
not a right granted by the National Government. It is something
which Congress can neither give nor take away. In the division
of powers which marked the creation of our dual government the
power to confer corporate capacity was reserved to the States.
The decision, therefore, comes to this: Congress can by taxation
burden the exercise of a privilege which only a State can grant.
And the power to tax, it must be remembered, involves the power
to destroy.
This seems a long step from the theory of the men who
founded the republic. Forty years ago the Supreme Court, in a
memorable case denying the right of the National Government to
tax the salary of a State official, stated the theory as follows:
"The General Government, and the States, although both exist
within the same territorial limits, are separate and distinct sov-
ereignties acting separately and independently of each other
within their respective spheres. The former in its appropriate
sphere is supreme; but the States within the limits of their
powers not granted, or, in the language of the Tenth Amendment,
'reserved,' are as independent of the General Government as that
Government within its sphere is independent of the States."'
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The court buttresses its recent decision by the argument ex
necessitate-that to hold otherwise would open the way for men
to withdraw their business activities from the reach of Federal
taxation and thus cripple the National Government. The Court
says:
"The inquiry in this connection is: How far do the implied
limitations upon the taxing power of the United States over ob-
jects which would otherwise be legitimate subjects of Federal
taxation, withdraw them from the reach of the Federal Govern-
ment in raising revenue, because they are pursued under fran-
chises which are the creation of the States ?* * * Let it be sup-
posed that a group of individuals, as partners, were carrying on a
business upon which Congress concluded to lay an excise tax.
If it be true that the forming of a State corporation would defeat
this purpose, by taking the necessary steps required by the State
law to create a corporation and carrying on the business under
rights granted by a State statute, the Federal tax would become
invalid and that source of national revenue be destroyed, except
as to the business in the hands of individuals or partnerships.
It cannot be supposed that it was intended that it should be
within the power of individuals acting under State authority to
thus impair and limit the exertion of an authority which may be
essential to national existence."
This argument will not bear scrutiny. It apparently loses
sight of the vital distinction between a tax on the mere doing of
business and a tax on the privilege of doing that business in a
corporate capacity. These are two very different things. The
right of Congress to tax the doing of business was not disputed.
It had been expressly upheld in the well-known case of Spreckels
Sugar Refining Co. v. McClain,2 which involved a tax on the
business of refining sugar, whether done by a corporation or by
individuals. The present tax, however, goes further and fastens
upon something new-something which in the case of individuals
or partnerships has no existence at all-which comes into being
only by the exercise of the sovereign power of a State. The
opponents of the tax, far from attempting to narrow the existing
field of Federal taxation, were in fact resisting an encroachment
by Congress on an entirely new field, created by and theretofore
reserved exclusively to the separate States. It was conceded that
Congress could tax a business when done by individuals and could
tax the same business when done by a corporation. The inquiry
was; does the act of a State in clothing the individuals with cor-
porate capacity create a new subject matter for taxation by the
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general Government? That was the real question before t!
Court, and the decision answers it in the affirmative.
Other illustrations of the same apparent confusion of thoug
are to be found in the opinion. For example, it is said (citing
various cases involving a tax on business where the party taxed
was a corporation) :
"We think it is the result of the cases heretofore decided in this
Court that such business activities, though exercised because of
State created franchises, are not beyond the taxing power of the
United States."
Here again the Court seems to lose sight of the distinction be-
tween a tax on "business activities" and a tax on the privilege of
conducting such activities in a corporate capacity.
It is futile, however, to quarrel with the logic of the opinion.
The question is closed and the Court, by affirming the judgments
appealed from, has committed itself to the theory that the Federal
Government may, by taxation, burden the exercise of a privilege
which only a State can confer. With the expediency of that
theory as applied to present-day political conditions we are not
now concerned. The object of this paper is to point out that
the decision marks a distinct departure from the earlier doctrine
that the two sovereignties, Federal and State, are upon an equality
within their respective spheres.
In view of the centralizing forces which are tending to trans-
form these sovereign States into mere political subdivisions of a
nation, the decision is of vital significance. Moreover in a very
practical way it touches the right of each State under the compact
evidenced by the Federal Constitution to manage its internal
affairs free from compulsion or interference by the other States.
To illustrate: In some parts of the country the anti-corporation
feeling runs high. Many men if given their way would tax the
larger corporations out of existence. Under this decision the
way is open whenever a majority can be secured in Congress.
An increase in the tax rate is all that would be necessary. Make
the rate ten per cent. or twenty per cent. instead of one per
cent. and the thing is accomplished.
New York may deem it good policy to encourage the carrying on
of industry in a corporate form. Texas may take a different view
and conclude that the solution of the Trust problem lies in sup-
pressing certain classes of corporations altogether. Under this
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decision it lies within the power of Texas and her associates if
sufficiently numerous to impose their view on New York and
make it impossble for her domestic industries to be carried on
profitably in a corporate form. And yet the possibility of im-
pressing the will of one State or group of States upon another
State with respect to her internal affairs is the very thing which
the founders- of the Republic sought most carefully to avoid.
to the general Government involved such a curtailment of State
independence, few States, in all probability, would have been ready
Had it been understood in 1787 that the grant of taxing powers
to ratify the Constitution.
Charles W. Pierson.

